In defense of Barack’s foreign policy “Obamination”
submitted by Ben Self, student
To Harry and Patrick –
I like and respect you both, and I know you each to be quite intelligent, which is why I find it so disturbing that you have bought into the “regional instability” scare. As a member of the team of Obama supporters on campus “working fastidiously” to promote his candidacy, I have decided to offer my thoughts on what you describe somewhat grandiloquently as the “pernicious pitfall” of his foreign policy platform.
My first question to you gentlemen is a simple one: where’s the evidence? Where is the evidence that our staying in Iraq is going to improve the situation? One thing at least is clear—from the first day of our invasion, much has gone terribly wrong for the Iraqi people. Many tens of thousands have died and more than two million have had to take refuge in neighboring countries. As wrote former national security adviser to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in a recent article for The Washington Post, “The case for terminating the war is based on its prohibitive and tangible costs, while the case for ‘staying the course’ draws heavily on shadowy fears of the unknown.” By his measure, “President Bush’s and Sen. John McCain’s forecasts of regional catastrophe are quite reminiscent of the predictions of ‘falling dominoes’ that were used to justify continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Neither has provided any real evidence that ending the war would mean disaster.” Unfortunately, neither have you. It is clear, however, that you have fallen prey to their fear-mongering, and are thus genuinely concerned of the impact of our disengagement. In an attempt to convey to us the gravity of the situation, you make the claim that Barack’s “half-baked scheme” to withdraw would “threaten the stability of the world for years to come.” Now—how exactly, does even the present chaos in Iraq threaten global stability?
That aside, many U.S. military officials and politicians have of late attempted to make the case for long-term occupation. Most point to the supposed success of the ongoing surge—which began in early 2007—as evidence that our continued presence is essential to the “stability” of the nation. So is the surge working? Well—in any long-term sense, probably not. But there has been some reduction of violence in Iraq, especially since the bloodbath of 2006. However, as Nir Rosen explained in a recent article for the Nation, the current “lull in violence” probably has as much to do with other factors, such as “Sadr’s decision to impose a freeze…on his Mahdi Army militia.” Moreover, as noted in an April 9 article in the New York Observer, “both American and Iraqi casualties have been rising since the low point in December 2007 and with greater velocity over the past several weeks.” In Baghdad alone, according to the New York Times, civilian deaths in the month of March jumped 43 percent from February. Thus, even as regards that “crudest of measures”—the body count—gains linked to the surge may only have been temporary.
However, in the sense that there has been little “reconciliation” and, as yet, that no real political settlement has been achieved—the surge has largely failed. As Simon Jenkins explained in a recent article for the Guardian: “The surge was a military tactic, not a strategy. It was supposed to ‘supply politics with a breathing space.’” As part of this tactic, “Sunni warlords have been armed, ghettos created and the Mahdists possibly silenced for the time being. But these are sticking-plaster jobs. They have done nothing to bring Iraq’s communities together in some sort of political concord. It has rather realigned them for future conflict.” In a recent MSNBC interview, Dr. Brzezinski echoed this assessment of the situation. “We’re not only bogged down,” he said, “we’re part of the problem of Iraq, in the sense that our presence in Iraq is contributing to the continuing fragmentation of Iraqi society, and eventually of the Iraqi state. And thus we have no choice but to disengage.” In a sense, American military presence only prolongs the current political deadlock. “The truth is,” writes Jenkins, “there will be no peace…until the occupation is over. The occupation freezes politics.” Our presence in Iraq has never fostered the kind of “reconciliation” we seem to think is possible by prolonged engagement. If reconciliation is going to happen in Iraq, it is not going to happen on our terms.
As you may know, we’ve recently passed the fifth anniversary of the start of the Iraq war, and as of March 19, American troop strength was still marked at 157,000. Even under Obama’s current plan, we will have passed the seven-year anniversary before we have had a complete withdrawal of combat troops. Now, many proponents of prolonged occupation have argued that we have an ethical obligation in Iraq—to try to make the best of a situation we’ve helped to create. And for the moment, let’s suppose you’re right—that our staying in Iraq will help to “stabilize” the situation. At what point do you imagine Iraq would be sufficiently “stabilized” for us to disengage? How long is long enough? “Mr. McCain,” said Dr. Brzezinski, “has clearly indicated he is going to continue the war until there is some sort of a victory—however that is defined—and the definition keeps changing. And the victory is a little bit like the horizon, that is to say, it’s an imaginary objective, which recedes as you walk towards it.” Again, what evidence is there to suggest that a withdrawal postponed ten years would actually leave the nation in a more just and stable condition? And when exactly, does our involvement in Iraq become just an alternate (though hardly cost effective) form of colonial occupation?
Even if you may not view it as such, how could you possibly expect an Iraqi — or any Middle Easterner — to understand our occupation as anything less than a modern imperial operation? We are trying to rule over people with a long history of outside domination. They want us out. According to an ABC News poll conducted in March, “42 percent of Iraqis still also consider it ‘acceptable’ to attack American troops, 61 percent believe the presence of our troops is making security worse rather than better and only 26 percent support the occupation.” The chances are—if the Iraqis really choose their own government, we may not find it acceptable, but as long as we in part make the choice for them — they will never find it acceptable. We had no right going in, and no real idea what we were doing. And the notion that we should stay and will somehow improve the situation, represents exactly the same misunderstanding of the Iraqi people. At this point, our real ethical ‘obligation’ is to disengage, and let the Iraqis try to sort out this disaster on their own terms, the only terms on which it can ever truly be sorted out.
Ben Self is a senior history major and can be reached at selfbe@arlham.edu.
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